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Immigration
by Charles H. Kuck*
and Keith N. Jensen"
During the January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013 survey period,
courts in the Eleventh Circuit decided hundreds of cases affecting
immigration law. The following is a discussion of some of those decisions
that clarified important issues pertaining to immigration law in the
Eleventh Circuit.
I.

REVIEWING FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS IN ASYLUM CASES

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)' is clear: the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) may not apply a de novo standard of review
when considering the findings of fact of an Immigration Judge (IJ).2
One of the primary issues confronted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was whether an IJ's determination of
the likelihood of a future event is a determination of law that could be
correctly reviewed de novo by the BIA.' The court clearly established
that the BIA cannot review such a determination de novo without
engaging in "factfinding in the course of deciding appeals"-an action
expressly barred by the INA. 4
Twice in as many months, the Eleventh Circuit held that the BIA's de
novo review of the issue of whether a respondent seeking asylum has a

* Managing Partner of Kuck Immigration Partners, LLC, in Atlanta, Georgia. Adjunct
Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Brigham Young University (B.A.,
1986); Arizona State University Law School (J.D., 1989).
** Law Clerk at Kuck Immigration Partners, LLC, in Atlanta, Georgia. Brigham Young
University (B.A., 2010); SMU Dedman School of Law (J.D. Candidate, 2015).
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2012).
2. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(dX3)(i) (2013) ("The Board will not engage in de nouo review of
findings of fact determined by an immigration judge. Facts determined by the immigration
judge, including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to
determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly erroneous.").
3. See, e.g., Zhou Hua Zhu v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 703 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2013).
4. Id. at 1314 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv)).
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well-founded fear of persecution was improper.' In both cases, the BIA
erred in its determination that future persecution was a question of law
and thus reviewable de novo on appeal.6 In Zhou Hua Zhu v. United
States Attorney General,' the court held that the finding of the IJ-that
it was reasonably possible that a Chinese citizen returned to China
would be forcibly sterilized-was a factual determination and therefore
impermissibly reviewed de novo by the BIA.' Just over a month later,
the court drove the point home even further, holding that the BIA had
overstepped the statutorily set limitations on its review by overturning
the IJ's factual determination regarding the likelihood of future
persecution following a shooting in the Colombian respondent's home
and several subsequent death threats.' Due to the limitations placed
on the BIA's ability to overturn an IJ's determination that the respondent in an asylum case has a well-founded fear of future persecution, the
importance of making compelling and persuasive arguments before the
IJ is substantial.
II.

DETERMINING WHAT IS AN AGGRAVATED FELONY

Under the INA, an alien who commits an aggravated felony is
removable.o Though the definition of "aggravated felony" is absent
from the common law, the INA lists numerous offenses that constitute
an aggravated felony." Thus, the issue is whether the offense committed by the individual rises to the level of an aggravated felony within the
meaning of the statute.12
In February 2013, the Eleventh Circuit held that a shoplifting
conviction under the Criminal Code of Georgia" did not categorically
establish an aggravated felony, and because the record of conviction also
did not establish that the petitioner committed an aggravated felony, his
offense failed to warrant his removal on grounds that it was an

5. Id. at 1308; Erazo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 506 F. App'x 938, 942-43 (11th Cir. 2013).
Both cases held that the BIA conducts de novo review of the legal findings of the IJ, but
factual determinations are to be reviewed applying a clear-error standard. Zhou Hua Zhu,
703 F.3d at 1308; Erazo, 506 F. App'x at 944.
6. Zhou Hua Zhu, 703 F.3d at 1314; Erazo, 506 F. App'x at 943-44.
7. 703 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2013).
8. Id. at 1314.
9. Erazo, 506 F. App'x at 942.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(aX2)(AXiii) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at
any time after admission is deportable.").
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(aX43).
12. See generallyRamos v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2013); Jaggernauth
v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 432 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2005).
13. O.C.G.A. tit. 16 (2012).

2014]

IMMIGRATION

1041

aggravated felony.14 In Ramos v. United States Attorney General,"
the Eleventh Circuit overturned the BIA's holding that a Filipino
national and lawful permanent resident of the United States was
removable due to a shoplifting conviction, which the BIA held to be an
aggravated felony and thus grounds for his removal under the INA."*
Ramos successfully argued on appeal that the statutory definition of the
Georgia theft offense, of which he was convicted, was divisible in that it
punished some conduct that constituted theft under the federal statute
but also punished conduct that did not qualify as theft." The court
held that "a conviction under the Georgia statute for shoplifting with
intent to 'appropriat[e] merchandise to [one's] own use without paying
for the same,'" went beyond the federal definition of theft and was
rightly classified as divisible.18
The charging document is the next (and last) means by which the
government can demonstrate that the offense committed is categorically
theft.19 A holding that the charging document categorically fits the
INA's definition of theft would merit an aggravated felony classification;
however, in Ramos's case, the charge merely restated the divisible
Georgia statute, which the court had previously defined as falling short
of a theft offense conviction.20
This same issue arose later in the year in Donawa v. United States
Attorney General,2 ' where a Florida man, who conceded he was subject
to deportation, argued that he was not an aggravated felon under the
INA.22 Importantly, a conviction for an aggravated felony disqualifies
the individual from discretionary relief under the INA, such as
cancellation of removal.23 The Eleventh Circuit applied its recently
adopted test from Ramos and held that the appellant's conviction for
cannabis possession with intent to sell, which included both misdemean-

14. Ramos, 709 F.3d at 1072.
15. 709 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2013).
16. Id. at 1068, 1072.
17. Id. at 1069.
18. Id. at 1071 (alterations in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14(a)).
19. Id. at 1072.
20. Id.
21. 735 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013).
22. Id. at 1279.
23. Id. "The Attorney General may cancel removal of, and adjust to the status of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, an alien who is inadmissible or deportable
from the United States" if the alien, among other requirements, has not been convicted of
an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
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or offenses as well as felony offenses, was divisible and consequently not
an aggravated felony under the INA.'
The successful argument put forward by the appellants in Ramos and
Donawa will encourage other individuals facing deportation to seek
equitable relief even though they may have committed what would
previously have been classified as an aggravated felony that would bar
them from equitable relief under the INA. It is yet to be seen, but
anticipated that it may also drive the legislatures within the Eleventh
Circuit to draft tighter criminal statutes to more cleanly mesh state and
federal criminal law because of its import in this particular area of
immigration law.
However, these decisions have not come without some pushback from
the BIA and IJs. Both the BIA and each individual IJ is given
discretionary authority to determine whether the offense of shoplifting
is an offense of "moral turpitude"---disqualifying the individual from
relief under the INA.25 In In re Rivas,2 the BIA used this rationale
to deny eligibility for a respondent who argued that his shoplifting
conviction did not rise to the level of an aggravated felony under the
Eleventh Circuit's holding in Ramos.27 It seems clear that IJs and the
BIA will follow the Eleventh Circuit's approach to this issue. However,
if intent is included in the charging document, it may be found that the
respondent has committed a crime of moral turpitude, making the
respondent ineligible for relief under the INA.'

24. Donawa, 735 F.3d at 1278, 1280, 1281-82.
25. See In re Rivas, 2013 BIA LEXIS 13, *12-13 (2013).
The issue in both Ramos and Jaggernauth,was whether the petitioners were
removable for aggravated felony theft offenses, and neither decision addressed
whether the petitioners were removable for crimes involving moral turpitude,
which is the issue in the case before us. Furthermore, Jaggernauthwas decided
prior to the respondent's hearing before the Immigration Judge and therefore
could have been raised at that time.
Id. at *13.
26. 2013 BIA LEXIS 13 (2013).
27. Id. at *12-13.
28. See In re Edmond, 2013 WL 4041239, at *1-2 (BIA July 29, 2013). The BIA applied
the categorical approach in its evaluation of Edmond's offense and ultimately concluded
that without an intent element the offense could not rise to the level of moral turpitude.
Id.
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MOTION To REOPEN FILING DEADLINE
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE TOLLING

In Avila-Santoyo v. United States Attorney General,2 9 the Eleventh
Circuit, sitting en banc and overruling its prior precedent, held that the
ninety-day deadline following a removal order to file for reopening could
be equitably tolled.o The INA clearly states that the respondent has
ninety days from the date of entry of a final administrative order of
removal to file the motion to reopen, unless one of the statutory
exceptions is met.3 ' This seems clear enough, but in light of recent
case law from the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit
was prompted to re-evaluate its once hard-line stance. Importantly,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the ninety-day deadline is not jurisdictional-this coincides with -the INA." Additionally, the court noted
that because the ninety-day deadline is not "unusually generous,"
equitable tolling may (and likely will be) appropriate in some situations." The Eleventh Circuit made note of the Supreme Court's
interpretation that the inclusion of several stated exceptions to the INA's
ninety-day filing rule does not mean that Congress intended to preempt
all other equitable means of tolling." The BIA has applied the holding
inAvila-Santoyo to mean that an equitable tolling exception requires the
following: first, a showing of a diligent pursuit of the individual's rights
and, second, some extraordinary circumstance that prevented compliance
with the ninety-day filing deadline.36 However, it should be noted that
the BIA has been wary of permitting a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel to suffice for the "exceptional circumstances" standard set in
Avila-Santoyo."

29. 713 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013).
30. Id. at 1363-64.
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) ("Except as provided in this subparagraph, the motion
to reopen shall be filed within [ninety] days of the date of entry of a final administrative
order of removal.").
32. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (holding that "the timeliness
provision in the federal habeas corpus statute is subject to equitable tolling").
33. Avila-Santoyo, 713 F.3d at 1362. "The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider
on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)
(2013).
34. Avila-Santoyo, 713 F.3d at 1363.
35. Id. at 1363-64.
36. In re Arroliga, 2013 WL 3899846, at *1 (BIA July 19, 2013).
37. See, e.g., In re Benjamin-Stubbs, 2013 WL 5872196, at *1 (BIA Oct. 17, 2013)
(holding that the litigant failed to act in due diligence though she likely suffered from
ineffective counsel).
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Several months later, in Ruiz-Thrcios v. United States Attorney
General," the Eleventh Circuit faced a nuanced issue raised by its
prior decision in Avila-Santoyo-whether equitable tolling was permissible to appellants who filed a motion to reopen more than once, as the
INA permited.39 The appellant presented a seemingly reasonable issue
of law for the court to decide; just as 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) clearly
sets out the ninety-day filing rule and its exceptions, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) clearly states that respondents may only file one motion to reopen
following their removal order.4 0 Nevertheless, the court held that the
BIA failed to determine first whether the one-motion rule is a jurisdictional issue (the court of appeals first held in Avila-Santoyo that the
ninety-day rule did not have jurisdictional implications). It may seem
that the court of appeals "passed the buck" in Ruiz-Trcios, but
according to the court's own opinion that is not the case. The court
stated, "Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to
an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in
agency hands."4 2
The BIA has looked to the decision in Ruiz-Trcios for guidance when
evaluating whether it is appropriate to equitably toll the time limit for
a motion to reopen. One of the common justifications brought to invoke
equitable tolling is a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. However,
if all of the elements of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim are not
met, the BIA has not been willing to forgive noncompliance with the
ninety-day filing rule.43 The BIA has also been willing to accept the
discretionary authority bestowed upon it by the Ruiz-Trcios decision-if
an IJ desires to hear a motion to reopen, even though the ninety-day
filing deadline has passed, the IJ has the discretionary authority to do
so under Ruiz-Turcios."

38.
39.
40.
under

717 F.3d 847 (11th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 850.
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) ("An alien may file one motion to reopen proceedings
this section, except that this limitation shall not apply so as to prevent the filing of

one motion to reopen. . . .").

41. Avila-Santoyo, 713 F.3d at 1361.
42. Ruiz-Turcios, 717 F.3d at 850 (quoting INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16
(2002)).
43. An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is not valid unless all of the elements are
met, including the following: (1) filing of an affidavit by the appellant's attorney attesting
to the prior counsel's agreement to represent the client; (2) filing of a formal complaint with
the appropriate state bar association; and (3) allowing the prior counsel a chance to
respond. See In re Roberts, 2013 WL 3899814, at *1 (BIA July 9,2013); In re Lozada, 1988
BIA LEXIS 19 (1988).
44. For example, subsequent to Ruiz-Turcios, the BIA held that the presence of new
facts in a case warranted an equitable tolling of a motion to reopen the filing deadline. In
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IV. BIA HOLDS, AND ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMs, STATUTORY BAR
DOES NOT EXEMPT SUPPORT GIVEN TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION
UNDER DURESS

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the BIAs holding that the INA does not
make an exception to the material-support bar for aiding a terrorist
organization, even when the support was offered involuntarily or under
duress.4 5 Section 1182 of the INA46 deals with the specific acts and
conditions that disqualify individuals from receiving relief from negative
immigration action. This section also states that an individual who
knows or reasonably should have known such acts would render aid to
a terrorist organization is barred from relief under the INA." The
court justified its hard-line stance applying the well-known canon of
statutory interpretation known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius;
the court noted that the INA lists specific exceptions for individuals who
are barred on account of their affiliation with a totalitarian party.4 8 In
Alturo v. United States Attorney General,"' the court took special care
to note that every circuit that had addressed the issue has held that the
INA does not contain an implied exception to the material-support bar
for support provided involuntarily or under duress."o
In October 2013, the court restated its holding from Alturo and held
that a Colombian national was ineligible for withholding of removal
because he rendered aid to a terrorist organization under the meaning
of the INA when he provided members of the Revolutionary Armed

re Tiwari, 2013 WL 4041257, at *1 (BIA July 31, 2013).
45. Alturo v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 716 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)iXI), (a)(3XBXiv)(VI). Section 1182(aX3XBXivXVI) of the
INA states that an alien is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal if
the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support, including
a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other
material financial benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons
(including chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or training...
to a terrorist organization described in subelause (I) or (II) of clause (vi) or to any
member of such an organization ....
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
48. Alturo, 716 F.3d at 1314 (contrasting the language of 8 § 1182(a)(3)(D)(ii), which
expressly states an exception for involuntary support of a totalitarian regime, with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(3XBXi), which states the exceptions from the material-support bar but does not
include involuntary support). See also BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 661-62 (9th ed. 2009)
(defining expressio unius est exclusio alterius as a "canon of construction holding that to
express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative").
49. 716 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2013).
50. Id. at 1314.
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Forces of Colombia (FARC) air transportation, even though he did so
under duress." It is clear that rendering aid to a terrorist organization, as set out in the INA, is a disqualifying act with no implied
exception." The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly stated that should
Congress intend to afford an exemption for this particular subsection, it
could enact a specific exception, as it has for other actions making
individuals inadmissible under the INA."
V. ADVANCE PAROLE EXIT DOES NOT QUALIFY AS "DEPARTURE"
The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed a key BIA holding, clarifying that
an individual who leaves the country after having received advance
parole is not disqualified from adjusting his status because advance
parole does not meet the statutory definition of "departure" under the
INA." The court of appeals affirmed the BIA's "common sense"
reasoning that individuals who had obtained advance parole to travel
temporarily outside the country should not be disqualified from the
opportunity to adjust their status.
This is one area of the law that was logically explained by the BIA and
coincides with realistic policy application. It never made sense to grant
individuals permission to leave the country after they had gone through
the proper channels to receive that permission, and then to punish them
later when they seek further relief that they may be entitled to under
the INA. This is an important clarification first adopted by the BIA and
justly endorsed by the Eleventh Circuit.

51. Bravo Benitez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 2013 WL 5750618, at *1, *2 (11th Cir. Oct. 24,
2013). In Bravo Benitez, the court stated, "Bravo's argument that his support was de
minimis rather than material is also without merit. The plain language of the material
support bar lists 'transportation' as an example of material support, and Bravo provided
the FARC with air transportation." Id. at *2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
52. See supra note 47.
53. E.g., Alturo, 716 F.3d at 1314 ("While the result might reasonably be viewed as
harsh, we are constrained by the language Congress chose to use and the BIA's reasonable
construction of that language. It is up to Congress, not the courts, to correct any perceived
inequity.").
54. Ortiz-Bouchet v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 714 F.3d 1353, 1357 (11th Cir. 2013).
In [In re]Arrabally,which was decided while this appeal was pending before this
Court, the BIA held "that an alien who has left and returned to the United States
under a grant of advance parole has not made a 'departure ... from the United
States' within the meaning of [§ 1182(a)(9)(BXiXII)]."
Id. at 1357 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting In re Arrabally, 2012 BIA
LEXIS 12, at *17 (2012)).
55. Id. The BIA clarified this point after Arrabally had already been set for appeal.
Id. The court held that the respondent was eligible for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)
(B)(iXII) because she had left the United States after receiving advance parole. Id.
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There are, of course, many other opinions and decisions that deserve
mention in a survey article. These chosen individual cases show a trend
in what some would call a "liberalization" of the Eleventh Circuit in its
immigration decisions, and virtually all of them are welcomed by the
attorneys of the private immigration bar and their clients.
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